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ESSAY 
WHERE IS THE MORALITY? MORAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND TRADE LAW 
Elizabeth Schéré* 
ABSTRACT 
The concept of moral rights - that is, whether an author has 
personal rights over his work that go beyond property rights - created 
tensions between the European Union and the United States during 
the negotiations of international intellectual property agreements. 
This paper examines that conflict through the prism of international 
copyright and trade law, specifically the Berne Convention and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). As trade relations have been subsumed by international 
copyright law, the time seems appropriate to revisit the French-born 
legal notion of moral rights. Although it has been excluded from the 
TRIPS agreement (much to the United States’ relief), this issue has 
resurfaced in today’s globalized and digital world, as authors may 
acquire rights that they do not have at home by crossing borders. This 
paper delves into the power imbalance between economic and 
personal rights and the legal and political ramifications of these 
rights on the international stage. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Moral rights were excluded from the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPS”) as a result of the United 
States’ political and economic pressure on other signatories during the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) in 1994.1 The United States took the point of view that 
personal incentives were incompatible with a primarily economic 
agreement that was meant to encourage and facilitate trade. As culture 
is commodified, issues of ownership, protection, and compensation 
are bound to arise. At the international level, Professor Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie posited that, “the incorporation of intellectual property 
agreements within trade mechanisms . . .  might deprive intellectual 
property policymaking of the rich palette of human values that 
historically has influenced its formulation.2 Although Dinwoodie is 
not referring to the traditional divide in copyright law between 
personal and property rights, his reflection brings up a salient 
question in this inquiry: what role do moral rights, a “humanist” 
value, play on the international stage? Should they be considered to 
be a baseline right that is protected by multilateral trade and 
intellectual property agreements? 
To answer the question, this Essay will first define moral rights 
and examine the ways in which they exemplify the diverging schools 
of thought regarding copyright law. This is followed by a look at                                                                                                                             
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
2. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property 
System, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2002). 
2018] WHERE IS THE MORALITY? 775 
moral rights on the international agreement stage. Specifically, this 
Essay attempts to ascertain whether moral rights have played a role in 
the harmonization imperatives of international intellectual property 
rights. 
II. PERSONALITY AND PROPERTY: THE DICHOTOMY OF 
MORAL RIGHTS 
A. Moral Rights on the Old Continent 
The moral rights doctrine originated in France during the 19th 
century. 3  Le Droit d’Auteur (author’s rights) recognizes that the 
author has a right over his creation that goes beyond exploitative 
rights (the property rights approach): these rights are personal, non-
pecuniary, and inseparable from human rights (the natural rights 
approach).4  According to this view, a person is born with natural 
rights, though not necessarily with property rights. The former 
protects the person, the latter what he owns. These moral rights have 
been accepted and adopted within every civil law system within the 
European Union. These general principles include the right of 
paternity or attribution, and the right of integrity. 5  The right of 
paternity gives the author the right to choose whether to include his 
name in the work, or to publish it anonymously or under a 
pseudonym.6 This right, which is directly linked to the persona of the 
author, his inner-self, cannot be licensed or assigned away.7 In other 
words, an employer who hires the author to create a work cannot avail 
himself of this right, though they may own the copyright to the work.8 
The right of integrity, on the other hand, protects the author’s work 
from any kind of modification, distortion or mutilation.9                                                                                                                             
3. Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Moral Rights Exclusion in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: A Legal Proposal for the 
Inclusion of Moral Rights in Future Free Trade Agreements in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 35 REV. DER. P.R. 97 (1996). 
4. DIEGO ESPÍN CÁNOVAS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL ESPAÑOL, DERECHOS REALES, 
VOLUME 2, 392-398 (7th ed. 1985).  
5. This Essay will not discuss moral rights as interpreted by the English/Commonwealth 
common law system. 
6. Arathi Ashok, Moral Rights – TRIPS and Beyond: The Indian Slant, 59 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 697, 700 (2013).  
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Jul. 
24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention for the 
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The copyright statutes currently in force in France, Germany, 
and Italy contain provisions protecting the rights mentioned above, as 
well as the right of disclosure, whether the author decides to publish 
the work and make it public or keeps it private, and withdrawal.10 
Moral rights, as they are understood in Continental or mainland 
Europe, are inalienable and fundamental rights that belong to the 
author of each work. 11  In other words, the underlying final 
justification for moral rights is linked to the individual and the 
protection of his personhood. 
B. Moral Rights in the United States 
The US Constitution states that Congress has the power to 
“[p]romote the progress of Science and useful Arts.” 12   Yet this 
provision does not go far enough. Where copyright is concerned, 
there needs to be a greater balance between the author’s rights and  
congress’s interest in the social and economic advancement of these 
domains. Specifically, the balancing approach needs to be defined 
within specific limits, measuring society’s economic needs against the 
author’s moral and property rights.13 Despite its obligations under the 
Berne Convention and its role as a vocal global champion of 
intellectual property rights, the United States does not protect moral 
rights to the same extent that its European counterparts do.14 Instead, 
the United States grants narrow moral rights to authors through the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), and also protects 
                                                                                                                            
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works originally was signed September 9, 1886, and was 
revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. The convention went into force in the United 
States on March 1, 1989. The implementing legislation also went into effect on March 1, 1989. 
See generally Deborah Ross, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations 
for Authors' Moral Rights, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363 (1990).  
10. See Wiscovitch Rentas , supra note 3, at 104.  
11. Id. However, not all European countries extend moral rights protection beyond the 
term of the copyright. Germany ties moral rights protection to copyright protection in the sense 
that moral rights protection ends when copyright protection ends. Conversely, in France, 
inalienability is meant to apply even after the author’s copyright ends. 
12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13. See Wiscovitch Rentas , supra note 3, at 104. A balancing approach would ensure 
that authors are not proverbially sacrificed in the name of the aforementioned progress. This 
line of thought posits that only protecting the work and not the author hurts the potential for 
more works in the long run.   
14. Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 873, 875 (2014). 
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authors from trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. 15  In 
other words, moral rights are not independently considered in the 
United States, as they are in Continental Europe, but are instead 
cloaked in the “guise of other legal theories” such as unfair 
competition, invasion of privacy, defamation, and breach of 
contract.16 In addition, the United States offers an extensive and non-
exhaustive fair use doctrine, which acts as a powerful defense against 
a copyright owner’s claim. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, there are two conflicting 
approaches to moral rights. On one hand, Continental Europe 
considers moral rights to be intrinsically linked to copyright law. On 
the other hand, the United States accepts moral rights, but at arm’s 
length, like an extrinsic feature. These conflicting views, as this paper 
will demonstrate, are magnified on the international treaty stage. 
III. COMPLIANCE AND HARMONIZATION: MORAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. The Berne Convention 
International copyright law was enacted by the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886. 
This text established the concept of an author’s exclusive rights. 17 It 
instituted a minimum standard that all member countries were 
required to recognize as well as national treatment.18 The latter is the 
foundational principle of the Convention (and a trade law tenet), and 
signifies that Berne signatories must grant authors the same protection 
they accord to their own nationals. 19  Moral rights were only 
recognized by the Convention in 1928, via an amendment that added 
Article 6bis. 20  The latter’s addition to the Convention halted and                                                                                                                             
15. Brandi L. Holland, Moral Rights Protection in the United States and the Effect of the 
family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 on U.S. International Obligations, 39 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 233 (2006). 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).  
16.  Monica Killian, A Hollow Victory for the Common Law? TRIPS and the Moral 
Rights Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321 (2003). 
17.  Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 16-17 (1988). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 5. 
20. Berne Convention, supra note 9. “Independently of the author’s economic rights…the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
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complicated the United States’ willingness to accede to the 
Convention. From Congress’s utilitarian-minded standpoint, the 
natural approach to moral rights would conflict with the property-
based approach to copyright enshrined in Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution. However, the United States finally joined the 
Convention in 1988, largely because it was in their interest to have 
their intellectual property works protected abroad via the national 
treatment principle and to be in a position to influence a strong 
protection of their works abroad. 21  However, the United States 
successfully avoided the issue of moral rights by enacting the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which stated that the 
Convention was not “self-executing in that existing law satisfied the 
United States’ obligations in adhering to the Convention.” 22  As a 
result, the U.S. created VARA, which grants moral rights to artists to 
appease the domestic lobby and to ease the latter’s criticism for not 
providing a higher standard of protection to its authors.23 However, 
considering how narrowly VARA is defined (it only protects a 
specific type of artists, “visual artist”, and only protects a specific 
type of art, “visual art”), and how many exceptions are in place 
(“work made for hire” and “fair use”) in U.S. Copyright law, it is 
surprising that the United States has been able to shield itself from the 
European-led push for moral rights in international agreements. 24 
Conversely, considering the technological advancements of the past 
thirty years, the intellectual property shake ups caused by the digital 
revolution (i.e. the borderless nature of the internet vs. the territorial 
nature of copyright), and a hungry global market for US audiovisual 
services and products, Congress may have to reconsider its position as 
the winds of copyright change. 
B. TRIPS Agreement 
It is evident from the United States’ reluctance to adhere to the 
Berne Convention, and its subsequent avoidance of the moral rights 
provision, that international copyright harmonization, with regard to                                                                                                                             
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.” 
21. Id., arts. 5(1), 5(3). See generally Burger, supra note 17.  
22. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing S. Rep. No. 
100-352, at 9-10 (1988)). 
23.  See Killian, supra note 16, at 330.  
24. 17 U.S.C. §106(a).  
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this subject, is currently off the negotiation table.25 In fact, the United 
States was able to convince the other members of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) to exclude Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention from the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Agreement (“TRIPS” Agreement), which incorporates the substantive 
provisions of the Berne Convention. 26  Article 9.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement explicitly states that, “Members shall not have rights or 
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred 
under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention or of the rights derived 
therefrom.”27 To some, this exclusion seemed surprising, since the 
United States had signed the Berne Convention and incorporated 
exhaustive moral rights in VARA.28 However, this paper agrees with 
Professor Dinwoodie that the internationalization of intellectual 
property is “subsumed within the broader apparatus of trade 
relations.” 29  The potential for harmonization of moral rights is 
directly related to how much protection nations want to grant and 
receive. For example, the United States purposefully excluded Article 
6bis to ensure that WTO members could not use the dispute 
settlement process against them with regard to this subject. 30  To 
include this provision would have given moral rights teeth since the 
Berne Convention provides no enforcement mechanism, meaning 
signatories may be penalized for violating their obligations. 31 
However, this paper wonders how much the addition of Article 6bis 
into TRIPS would affect international trade? Was the United States 
worried that Art. 6bis’s “honor and reputation” requirement might be 
used as an affirmative defense? Similar to the “public morals” general 
exception defense under Article XX of GATT?32 Unlikely, since the 
exceptions to TRIPS are clearly stated in the agreement and if 
Congress was that concerned it could have fought to include moral 
                                                                                                                            
25.  See Yu, supra note 14, at 875-76.  
26. Id. at 876. 
27. Id.  
28. Id. 
29. See Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 1003.  
30. See GATT, supra note 1.  
31. See Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 995, 1005-06.  
32. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX. ( (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to 
protect public morals; . . . (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic, or archeological value . . . ”).  
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rights in the exceptions section of that agreement.33 In addition, in the 
US legal system, WTO law appears to have no direct effect, meaning 
its provisions cannot be invoked by the parties before a court of law. 
Moreover, even when an international agreement does have direct 
effect, it can never claim supremacy because a federal statute may 
override the international agreement.34 
Based on the national legal procedure explained above, it 
appears that including moral rights in the TRIPS agreement would not 
adversely affect the United States. However, its exclusion from 
TRIPS, and other treaties such as NAFTA, may provoke an unbalance 
of rights and obligations among the parties involved – as we will see 
in the following section. 
IV. IT’S COMPLICATED: THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT AGREEMENTS ON MORAL RIGHTS 
A National Treatment 
National treatment is a fundamental principle in all five major 
multilateral treaties concerning copyright: the Berne Convention, the 
Rome Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(“WPPT”).35 This principle is convenient for countries as it “allows a 
treaty member and its courts to apply their own law – the law they’re 
familiar with.” 36  That being said, the nec plus ultra, the highest 
attribute of national treatment is its “substantive bite,” as it requires 
parties to the agreement to extend protection to non-nationals on the                                                                                                                             
33. For example, Article 13 of TRIPS states that, “Members shall confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.” TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).  
34. See generally Andrew Guzman & Joost H.B. Pauwelyn, International Trade Law, 
(2d ed. 2012). . The U.S. implemented the results of the Uruguay Round in the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA), P.L. 103-465. The statute states under Sec. 102(c) that no 
WTO provision can operate to change prior or subsequent US law.  
35. Ulrich Loewenheim, The Principle of National Treatment in the International 
Conventions Protecting Intellectual Property, in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: LIBER AMICORUM JOSEPH STRAUS 593 (Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck 
and Pyrmont, Martin J. Adelman, Robert Brauneis, Josef Drexl & Ralph Nack, eds. 2009). 
36. Id.  
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same terms as they do their nationals.37 The potential issue is that the 
exclusion of moral rights from bilateral and multilateral agreements 
creates an imbalance between the relevant parties. For example, under 
NAFTA, article 6bis is also excluded. 38  Therefore, parties from 
Mexico and Canada would not be able to evoke moral rights in the 
United States but the US party would be able to evoke these rights in 
these countries, who both have moral rights established in their 
national legal system.39 Yet, it could be that this “double standard” 
resulting from national treatment is not widely considered 
problematic by signatories of international intellectual property 
agreements. Robert Brauneis, Professor of Law at George 
Washington University Law School, found that while national 
treatment has been featured in over 200 GATT complaints, it has 
featured in fewer than twenty TRIPS complaints; none of those 
complaints involved copyright or related rights. 40  This may be 
because the states involved in these agreements may or may not offer 
copyright protection that exceeds minimum requirements imposed by 
them. And, if additional protection is offered, it may be offered by 
many other countries, thus limiting the divergence of a national 
treatment rule from that of a rule of material reciprocity.41 However, 
this latter argument may be a double-edged sword because “material 
reciprocity is an abrogation of the national treatment given to 
protectable works of expression.” 42 For example, in Huston v. La 
Cinq 43, La Cour de cassation (the French Supreme Court) had to 
decide whether to apply US copyright law or French copyright law, 
when  the John Huston estate sued the Turner Corporation (which 
owned the economic rights to the film) as well as the French                                                                                                                             
37. Id. 
38. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA], vol. I, pt. 4, ch. 17, Annex 1701.3. (“Notwithstanding, Art. 
1701(2)(b), this Agreement confers no rights and imposes no obligation on the United States 
with respect to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, or the rights derived from that Article”).  
39. See Rentas, supra note 3, at 23.  
40. See generally Robert Brauneis, National Treatment in Copyright and Related Rights: 
How Much Work Does it Do?, GW LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS & OTHER WORKS, PAPER 
810 (2013). 
41.  Id. 
42. See generally Stephen Frase, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules 
and Roadblocks on the Global Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 759 (1997). 
43.  Huston v. La Cinq, Cour de cassation, première chambre civile [Cass. [supreme 
court for judicial matters], 1e civ., May 28, 1991, Bull. civ. I, No.172 (Fr.)  
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television channel, La Cinq, regarding the rights to show a film.  The 
Turner Corporation wanted US law to apply, since US copyright law 
would not recognize moral rights in this specific case, whereas the 
Huston estate argued for French copyright law, which would have 
applied the moral right of integrity. The Cour de cassation, basing its 
decision on national legislation, which guarantees moral rights for all 
authors of creative works, regardless of nationality, sided with 
Huston’s heirs.44 Based solely on the principle of material reciprocity 
(which French law does apply to copyright in general),45 the French 
court could have refused to apply French law in order to refuse moral 
rights to Huston’s work. 
In her article Moral Rights of Artists in an International 
Marketplace, Leslie A. Pettenati laments the lack of uniform 
protection of moral rights in international agreements, positing that 
the issue is bound to grow as a result of new technologies.46 This 
paper was published in 2000, before the ascension of OTTs (over-the-
top media services) such as SVODs (subscription video-on-demand) 
and new media platforms (e.g. the smartphone). As a result, an 
author’s control over the dissemination and potential manipulation of 
his or her work is becoming unmanageable and “forum shopping” for 
moral rights is not a far-fetched possibility, especially considering the 
fact that international intellectual property agreements remain, 
perhaps purposely, vague on choice of law methods.47 
B. The Minimum Standard 
As mentioned above, multilateral agreements impose minimum 
requirements. These are known as “minimum standards.” The Berne 
Convention, the TRIPS agreement, as well as the other copyright 
agreements mentioned, have agreed to certain minimum standards in 
an attempt to create, on an international scale, baseline protection (i.e. 
harmonization). For example, the Berne Convention, applicable to 
TRIPS, states that the duration of protection “must be granted until 
                                                                                                                            
44. Id.  
45. See Loi N. 64-689 du 8 juillet 1964 sur l’application du principe de réciprocité en 
matière de protection du droit d’auteur. 
46. Leslie A. Pettenati, Moral Rights of Artists in an International Marketplace, 12 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 425 (2000). 
47. Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes (Am. Law. Inst. 2008).  
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the expiration of the 50th year after the author’s death.”48 A country 
may choose to offer additional protection, such as the United States.49 
Would it be necessary to include moral rights into the “minimum 
standards”? As noted above, states have either already embraced these 
rights in their original format (i.e. copyright law), prior to signing 
these international agreements, or they have incorporated them in 
their derivative, “remake” format, under contract or tort law – and 
apart from the United States, most Berne-signatories have 
incorporated the minimum standard for moral rights into their 
national legislation. 
Advances in technology and digital media, as well as 
globalization, have changed the face of copyright. As Professor 
Dinwoodie noted, trade law has now absorbed intellectual property, 
shifting its essence of balancing economic and personal interests in 
favor of the former.50 It should therefore come as no surprise that the 
TRIPS agreement, the IP section of the World Trade Organization, 
would not include moral rights in its minimum standards of 
protection, although the European Union negotiated in its favor. The 
United States remains the world’s largest bargaining power. This 
paper advances that even an additional protocol or agreement on 
moral rights within the confines of WIPO or another intellectual 
property organization would not lead to harmonization in this field. 
For purely economic reasons, the United States will continue to 
oppose transposing the European model of moral rights into its 
national copyright legislation, unless a strong argument is made for 
moral rights as an advantage to international trade. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Harmonization is not unification. It does not lead to a uniform 
set of agreed rules but seeks to coordinate various legal systems by 
creating minimum requirements. Harmonization facilitates the 
dissemination of copyrighted works by providing transparency and 
protection within the countries involved. Moral rights are currently 
not on the ballot for harmonization. Even in Europe, the birthplace of 
moral rights, the EU Commission does not see any need for                                                                                                                             
48. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 7 § 1.  
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (states that United States grants copyright protection for 
seventy years after the death of an author).   
50. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 2. 
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harmonization, and it is resisting the demands of some European 
academics for community-wide regulation of moral rights.51 This lack 
of interest on the part of the Commission is even more interesting 
given that it has routinely criticized the United States for its lack of 
commitment to the cause of moral rights in copyright law.52 In most 
international copyright agreements, the rights that are being 
harmonized are procedural more than substantive. Furthermore, none 
of them are related to personal rights. Rights that are philosophically 
and historically linked to a country’s evolution are difficult to 
harmonize, as they imply more than a procedural modification. For 
that reason alone, one can understand the Commission’s deference. 
That being said, the author’s moral rights are not in any danger in the 
European Union. In the United States, where these rights are reserved 
to a selected few (VARA), it may be time for Congress to reassess 
their stance. As mentioned above, the face of copyright is changing, it 
is global and digital, and authors may start “forum shopping” for 
moral rights, such as it already exists for patents. 
 
                                                                                                                            
51. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Destructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 353, 358 
(2006). 
52. Id. 
